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One Nation Under God: Newdow v. United States Congress-a
Poorly Chosen Battle in the War over Separation of Church
and State
Russell W Johnson*
On June 26, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
shocked the nation by ruling that the Pledge of Allegiance-the
same Pledge that has been recited by public school students for
nearly 50 years'-is unconstitutional. The case, Newdow v. U.S.
Congress3 , was brought by Michael Newdow, a minister of
atheism 4 who takes offense at the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge.5 Newdow claimed injury because the state has interfered
with his right to direct the religious upbringing of his eight-year-
old daughter b, subjecting her to the recitation of the Pledge in her
public school. The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the addition
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004.
1. On June 22, 1942, The Pledge was originally codified as "1 pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for
which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 36
U.S.C. § 172 (1946) (amended 1954). Congress added the words "under God"
in 1954. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified as
amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
2. Newdow v U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), amended
by 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
3. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir.
Feb. 28, 2003).
4. April Shenandoah, Take One Dramamine and Call Me When It's Over,
at http://www.american-partisan.com/cols/2002/shenandoah/qtr3/0703.htm
(June 26, 2002) (stating that Newdow is a member of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State (AU), and is ordained by the Universal Life
Church as minister of atheism) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
5. Litigant Explains Why He Brought Suit, at
http:www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/26/Newdow.cnna/index.html (June 26, 2002)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
6. A major preliminary issue in Newdow v. U.S. Congress was whether
Michael Newdow had standing to bring suit. The Court of Appeals ruled that he
did because the state's interference with Newdow's right to direct the religious
(or non-religious) upbringing of his daughter constituted an injury in fact. See
Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602-05. But after Newdow won his appeal, it was widely
reported that he does not actually have primary custody of his daughter, and that
his daughter and her mother (who does have primary custody) both claim to be
of the words "under God" to the Pledge in 1954, 7 and a California
school district's policy of requiring students to recite the Pledge
daily,8  violates the Establishment Clause9  of the First
Amendment.10
practicing Christians that are not injured by the Pledge. E.g., Mom: Girl Not
Harmed by Pledging 'Under God', at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/16/pledge.mother/index.html (July 16,
2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review). Newdow subsequently
admitted, "My daughter is in the lawsuit because you need that for standing. I
brought this case because I am an atheist and this offends me .... ." Litigant
Explains Why He Brought Pledge Suit, supra note 5. But the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, while considering whether to rehear the suit's constitutional
issues en banc, issued an order confirming that Newdow still had standing
despite not having primary custody of his daughter. See Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that Newdow maintains
standing because he retains sufficient custodial rights).
7. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified as
amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
8. See Cal. Educ. Code § 52720 (1989) (calling for daily recitation of the
Pledge or other patriotic exercise).
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
U.S. CONST. amend 1. This provision is made applicable to the states and their
school districts by the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 580 (1992) (holding unconstitutional prayer at a public school graduation
ceremony).
10. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612 ("In conclusion, we hold that (1) the 1954 Act
adding the words "under God" to the Pledge, and (2) EGUSD's policy and
practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge, with the added words included,
violate the Establishment Clause."). In the amended opinion the Court of
Appeals limited the breadth of its decision by avoiding an express ruling on the
constitutionality of the Pledge. Instead the Court only held that the public
school's policy of daily recitation of the Pledge is unconstitutional. However, as
the dissent in the amended decision points out, even the amended decision
"4necessarily implies" that the act of Congress which added the words "under
God" to the Pledge is unconstitutional. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 2003 WL
554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (O'Scannlain J., dissenting).
Perhaps in an effort to avoid ultimate Supreme
Court review, Newdow 11 which replaces [the original
decision], avoids expressly reaching the technical
question of the constitutionality of the 1954 Act.
Fundamentally, however, the amended decision is
every bit as bold as its predecessor. It bans the
voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in the
public schools [which] ... necessarily implies that both
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Initially Newdow appeared to be a major victory for those
desiring a high wall of separation between church and state, but
winning this battle could ultimately cost Newdow and other
separationists' 1 the war. The case is likely to be overturned and has
created a public backlash that will benefit efforts to lessen the
degree of separation that currently exists. For that reason, Michael
Newdow's lawsuit was a poorly chosen battle in the war over
separation of church and state.
I. ESTABLISHING THE BACKGROUND
A. The Pledge
Francis Bellamy wrote the Pledge of Allegiance in 1892
without the words "under God."'12 Bellamy was employed by a
family magazine called "Youth's Companion" that also sold
American flags.' 3 The pledge originally read: "I pledge allegiance
to my Flag, and to the Republic for which it stands: one Nation
indivisible, With Liberty and Justice for all."' 4 The Pledge was
written for a Columbus Day celebration where twelve million
an Act of Congress and a California law are
unconstitutional ....
Id.
11. In this recent development, the term "separationists" will be used to
refer to people who advocate maintaining or increasing the current amount of
legal separation between church and state. The term "accomodationists" will
refer to those who advocate reducing the current amount of separation. These
terms are gross oversimplifications, but no other form of shorthand seems
appropriate as both groups include a mixture of theists and atheists, liberals and
conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, Federalists and Constitutionalists,
etc.
12. See Cecilia O'Leary & Tony Platt, Pledging Allegiance Does Not a
Patriot Make, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 2001, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/viewsOl/l 125-02.htm (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
13. See John W. Baer, The Strange Origin of the Pledge of Allegiance, at
http://archive.aclu.org/news/move/pledgeorigin.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003)
(on file with First Amendment Law Review).
14. The Story of the Pledge of Allegiance (Aug. 12, 2002) at
http://www.flagday.org/Pages/StoryofPledge.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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children 15 recited the Pledge to honor the 400th anniversary of
Columbus' arrival in North America.' 6  This event inspired the
practice of children reciting the pledge at the beginning of every
school day. 17
The Pledge was first altered at a National Flag Conference
in 1923, when the words "my flag" were replaced with "the flag of
the United States."' 8 A year later, "of America" was added after
"United States," making the first phrase, "Ipledge allegiance to the
flag of the United States of America... . 15 Thirty years later, the
words "under God" were added by an act of Congress, dividing the
phrase "one Nation" from the word "indivisible." 20 The words
were added during the Red Scare to differentiate the United States
from communist nations. 2' Ironically, Bellamy, the original
composer of the Pledge, was a socialist.
22
Controversy over the Pledge began as early as 1916 when
Hubert Eaves, an eleven-year-old black student, was arrested for
not demonstrating proper respect to the flag, which he considered a
symbol of Jim Crow laws and state-approved lynchings.23 During
World War II (prior to the addition of the words "under God"), a
Jehovah's Witness challenged a law requiring public-school
students to recite the Pledge, and the Supreme Court held that
15. Id.
16. Baer, supra note 13.
17. O'Leary & Platt, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified as
amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339-40 ("The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would
further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our Government upon
the moral directions of the Creator. At the same time it would serve to deny the
atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism with its attendant
subservience of the individual.").
22. Prior to working for the "Youth's Companion", Bellamy preached at
the Bethany Baptist Church in Boston, MA, but was barred after espousing anti-
capitalist propaganda in sermons like "Jesus as Socialist." Bellamy was also a
member of the Society of Christian Socialists, and first-cousin to Edward
Bellamy, a noted socialist writer. See Baer, supra note 13.
23. O'Leary & Platt, supra note 12.
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compelling students to recite the Pledge is a violation of the First
Amendment. 24 By that time the Pledge was seen as a symbol of
national unity, and the Supreme Court decision prompted the
harassment of a number of Jehovah's Witnesses, including the2 5
burning of a Kingdom Hall in Maine." The Pledge, which
students are no longer required to recite, then went almost fifty
years without being successfully challenged under the First
Amendment until Michael Newdow won his appeal in 2002.
B. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states
that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... ,,26 In the past, the Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause expansively as forbidding not just any law establishing a
state religion, but also any law "respecting" or touching such an
establishment. 27 In 1947, the Supreme Court metaphorically
defined its interpretation of the Establishment Clause by stating
that the First Amendment required "a wall of separation between
church and State."28
In the years that followed, the Court defended this wall by
using several tests that were encapsulated into the Lemon test in
1971.29 To survive the Lemon test, the government conduct in
question: (1) must have a secular purpose; (2) must have a
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) must not foster an excessive government
24. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[T]he
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.").
25. See Baer, supra note 13.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. i.
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("A given law might
not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the
First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
28. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
29. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971).
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entanglement with religion.30 Lemon v. Kurtzman,3' the case that
created the Lemon test, concedes that total separation is
impossible,32 but the plain language of the rule seems to require as
close to total separation as is possible. For that reason, the Lemon
test has produced a number of decisions favored by separationists
33
but has been decried by accomodationists as turning the Supreme
Court into a "national theology board,, 34 which has strayed from
protecting against indoctrination to attacking all things religious.
35
Supporting the latter sentiment is the fact that the Lemon
test was not meant to be an end in itself, but rather a means of
gaining insight into the question of whether a particular practice
violates the Establishment Clause.36 Regardless of this fact, for
more than ten years Lemon was applied as though it was an end in
itself, as it was the only test the Supreme Court applied in
30. Id.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. See id. at 614 ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separation
between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
Some relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable.").
33. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (holding
that public school curriculums cannot be designed with the purpose of
promoting religious beliefs); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
392-97 (1985) (holding that religious-school students cannot receive state-
sponsored aid that is "direct and substantial"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41-43 (1980) (holding that a law requiring the posting of Ten Commandments
in public-school classrooms violates Establishment Clause).
34. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (lamenting the court's decision to
evaluate what religious symbols mean), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
35. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court distorts existing precedent ... [b]ut
even more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it
bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life. Neither the holding
nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause .... ).
36. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("This is not to suggest, however, that we
are to engage in a legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must
govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form and style, the observance of
which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine the form of the relationship
for the light that it casts on the substance.").
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Establishment Clause cases until it decided Marsh v. Chambers
37
in 1983.38 Marsh addresses a challenge to the Nebraska
Legislature's practice of beginning sessions with a nonsectarian
prayer delivered by a clergyman who was appointed and
compensated by the legislature. 39 The practice seemed to fail the
Lemon test,40 but the Court was reluctant to strike it down,
presumably because it did not want to set a precedent that could be
used to eliminate numerous public references to religion, including
the Court's own practice of beginning its sessions with, "God save
the United States and this honorable court.'AI
Hard-pressed for an argument that the Nebraska practice
was acceptable under Lemon, the Court chose instead to make an
exception to the test.42 This exception was based on the Court's
historical analysis of the Establishment Clause, which reasoned
that because legislative prayer was an accepted practice when the
Constitution was written, the drafters must not have meant to
37. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
38. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 2002)
(tracing the history of the Lemon test and other Establishment Clause tests),
amended by 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
39. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784-86 ("The opening of sessions of
legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded
in the history and tradition of this country.").
40. See id. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I have no doubt that, if
any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the
question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice
to be unconstitutional.").
41. See id. at 786 ("In the very courtrooms in which the United States
District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard this case, the proceedings
opened with an announcement that concluded, 'God save the United States and
this Honorable Court.' The same invocation occurs at all sessions of this
Court.").
42. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent:
The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's
practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal 'tests'
that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the
Establishment Clause. That it fails to do so is, in a
sense, a good thing, for it simply confirms that the
Court is carving out an exception to the Establishment
Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.
Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prohibit it when they wrote the First Amendment.43 The Supreme
Court returned to the Lemon test in subsequent cases,"4 but Marsh
proved more than a mere exception.45 Its historical rationale
continued to influence the Court in subsequent cases.
46
This focus on original intent made it increasingly difficult
for the Court to enforce the literal requirements of the Lemon
test.47 if applied literally, Lemon would require the extraction of
countless public references to religion 48-a step the court has been
unwilling to take.49 In recent years, the Court has sought to
redefine Establishment Clause analysis by articulating the
"endorsement" test50 and the "coercion" test.51  But instead of
43. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 ("It can hardly be thought that in the same
week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a Chaplain for
each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for
submission to the States, they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.").
44. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-85 (1984) (applying
the Lemon test one year after making an exception in Marsh).
45. See infra note 46.
46. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-74 ("The Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause has comported with what history reveals was the
contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees."). In a fashion similar to the
majority opinion in Marsh, the Court goes on to cite historical examples of
public references to religion as reasons why including a Nativity scene in a
municipality's Christmas display does not violate the Establishment Clause. See
id. at 675-78.
47. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Taken to its logical extreme, some of
the language quoted above would require a relentless extirpation of all contact
between government and religion. But that is not the history or the purpose of
the Establishment Clause.").
48. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 ("Rather than mechanically invalidating all
governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition
to religion in general or to one faith--as an absolutist approach would dictate--
the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.")
(citations omitted).
50. The "endorsement" test was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Lynch and was later used by the Court in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir.
2002), amended by 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (describing the
development of the "endorsement" test).
[VoL I
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overruling Lemon, the "endorsement" 52 and "coercion" 53 tests have
merely supplemented it.54 The Supreme Court has yet to officially
adopt one of these three tests55 and, in at least one instance, it has
51. The "coercion" or "psychological coercion" test, was first used by the
Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman. See id. at 605.
52. Intended as a clarification of Establishment Clause analysis, the
"endorsement" test effectively collapsed the first two prongs of the Lemon test:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community.
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two
principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with
religious institutions.... The second and more direct
infringement is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.
See id. at 606 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88).
53. The Supreme Court created the "coercion" test when it held
unconstitutional the practice of including invocations and benedictions in the
form of "nonsectarian" prayers at public school graduation ceremonies.
Declining to reconsider the validity of the Lemon test, the Court in Lee found it
unnecessary to apply the Lemon test to find the challenged practices
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court "relied on the principle that 'at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a way which
establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' " Id. (quoting
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577-78 (1992)).
Although coercive practices certainly violate the Establishment Clause, it
is not a necessary element; non-coercive practices can violate the Establishment
Clause as well. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion .... "); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at
618 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Over the years, this Court has declared the
invalidity of many noncoercive state laws and practices conveying a message of
religious endorsement.").
54. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607 ("We are free to apply any or all of the
three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them.").
55. Id.
56
applied all three. Among the Lemon test, the "endorsement" test
and the "coercion" test, the Supreme Court currently has several
arrows in its constitutional quiver from which to choose.57
Additionally, a number of the Court's decisions over the
last fifty years appear contradictory to the layperson, and thus send
a confusing message to the public about what the First Amendment
requires. For example, in Lemon, the Court struck down two state
laws supplementing the salaries of parochial school teachers who
taught secular subjects,58 but the Court upheld statutes directing
school authorities to lend secular textbooks to parochial school
students59 and to reimburse parents of parochial school students for
bus transportation. 60 Additionally, the Court held that a state can
pay for a sign language interpreter to assist a deaf child attending a
sectarian school,' and that federal funds can be given to state
agencies that lend educational equipment and materials to
religiously-affiliated schools. 62 In similar fashion, the Court held
that it is unconstitutional for a school classroom to be turned over
to religious instructors,63 but it held in later cases that it is also
unconstitutional to exclude a Christian club from meeting at the
school after hours, 64 or for a state university to withhold funds
from a Christian student newspaper.
65
These cases involve complex issues, and the Court has
attempted to distinguish and clarify seeming contradictions, but the
56. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-17 (2000)
(applying all three tests to invalidate public school policy permitting student-led,
student-initiated prayer before football games).
57. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607 ("The Supreme Court has not repudiated
Lemon; in Santa Fe, it found that the application of each of the three tests
provided an independent ground for invalidating the statute at issue in that case;
and in Lee, the Court invalidated the policy solely on the basis of the coercion
test.").
58. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).
59. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
60. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
61. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
62. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000).
63. McCollum. v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
64. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
65. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46
(1995).
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message to the public and lower courts is that the Supreme Court
has effectively created an "I know it when I see it' 66 test.67 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit and the American public find themselves asking
the question: Is the United States one nation "under God?"
Newdow v. U.S. Congress epitomizes this confusion.6 ' The
majority opinion applies all three tests and finds the Pledge
unconstitutional under the plain language of each. The dissenting
opinion conversely argues that the Majority, through its formulaic
application of the rules, has lost sight of the purpose of the
Establishment Clause.69 The distance between these disparate but
defensible positions suggests one possible reason why the Court
has yet to choose a test or to define clearly what the Establishment
Clause requires: separationist precedent and an accomodationist
interpretation of intent cannot be easily reconciled.70
The idea of a wall of separation is at the heart of the
Newdow decision. In 1947, Justice Black wrote "[t]he First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That
wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach.' That language has been vuoted for decades
and has become part of the public consciousness. 72
66. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(describing the difficulty in deciding when something is pornography and thus
not protected by the First Amendment).
67. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (using all three tests to
invalidate the Pledge); see also Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (calling the task of
trying to patch together the "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier" described
in Lemon as "sisyphean").
68. Compare Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-12 (applying all three tests to find
the addition of the words "under God" a clear violation of the Establishment
Clause) with Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613 (Fernandez, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (refusing to apply any tests because the purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to avoid discrimination, not to drive religious
expression out of public thought).
69. See supra note 68.
70. See supra note 47.
71. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
72. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1
(2002) ("[The] phrase, 'separation of church and state,' provides the label with
which vast numbers of Americans refer to their religious freedom.").
2003]
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But accomodationists argue that Newdow is perfect
evidence of why it is dangerous to build up a body of law based
upon a figure of speech.73 To accomodationists, the metaphor is
misleading and does not reflect what the Constitution actually
requires. Some members of this school of thought argue that the
Constitution only forbids public funding of churches or
discrimination against particular faiths. 75 To a subscriber of this
interpretation, it seems ridiculous to read the Establishment Clause
as requiring the extrication of every public reference to religion.76
If the Supreme Court hears Newdow, it could settle the
debate over what the Establishment Clause requires by answering
the literal and figurative question: Is America one nation "under
God?" 7
7
73. See generally Stephen L. Carter, Reflections On the Separation of
Church and State, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 293, 294 (discussing the multiple
interpretations of the phrase based on historical perspectives).
74. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 ("The concept of a 'wall' of
separation is a useful figure of speech... [b]ut the metaphor itself is not a
wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in
fact exists between church and state.").
75. See HAMBURGER, supra note 72, at 481 (contending that "the
constitutional authority for separation is without historical foundation," but
rather was shaped by "broader cultural and social developments, including
ideals of individual independence, fears of Catholicism and various types of
specialization.").
76. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) The Court in Lynch
admitted as much, observing:
The Court has acknowledged that the 'fears and
political problems' that gave rise to the Religion
Clauses in the 18th century are of far less concern
today. We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of
Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or other powerful
religious leaders behind every public acknowledgement
of the religious heritage long officially recognized by
the three constitutional branches of government.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)).
77. This statement may be less true now that the Ninth Circuit has
amended its original opinion to avoid expressly ruling on the constitutionality of
the Pledge. By limiting its ruling to the school's practice, the Ninth Circuit
suggests that the Pledge may not be unconstitutional for everyone. See Newdow
v. U.S. Congress, 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (O'Scannlain J.,
dissenting) ("Newdow I... no longer exists; it was withdrawn after the en banc
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II. NEWDOWWILL BE REVERSED
Shortly after the Newdow decision was announced, the
Ninth Circuit stayed the effect of the controversial ruling and in
February of 2003 the Court declared that it would not rehear the
case.78 Because the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear Newdow, the
case will likely be appealed to the Supreme Court.79  If the
Supreme Court hears Newdow, it will likely reverse the decision
because the Court is weary of formulaic applications of the Lemon
test that do not comport with its interpretation of the Establishment
Clause's original intent.8° Newdow certainly does not appear to be
call failed. The panel majority has evolved to this extent: in Newdow I the
Pledge was unconstitutional for everybody; in Newdow If the Pledge is only
unconstitutional for public school children and teachers."). Compare the
amended opinion with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), where the Court
held that a public school may not have a prayer at a graduation ceremony
because "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to
act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.:
78. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28,
2003).
79. See Oliver Libaw, Pledging Religious Allegiance? Supreme Court
Likely to Have Final Say on First Amendment Issue, at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/pledge__effects020626.html (June
27, 2002) (discussing the likelihood that Newdow would be appealed prior to the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to rehear the case) (on file with the First Amendment
Law Review); see also California School District to Appeal Pledge Ruling to
Supreme Court, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/04/pledge.of.allegiance.ao/index.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2003) (reporting the school district's intention to appeal the case
to the Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit refused to rehear the case en banc)
(on file with First Amendment Law Review).
80. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Lemon has had a checkered career in the
decisional law of this Court."); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997)
(stating that Lemon's entanglement test is merely "an aspect of the inquiry into a
statute's effect"); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (collecting opinions
criticizing Lemon); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting) (stating that Lemon's "three-part test represents a determined effort to
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consistent with the Court's view of original intent,81 and the Court
has said several times in dicta that it would uphold public
references to religion like the words "under God" in the Pledge.
When first articulating the "endorsement" test, Justice
O'Connor made it clear that she would allow for government
acknowledgements of religious heritage such as the government
declaring Thanksgiving to be a public holiday, printing the words
"In God We Trust" on coins, praying in the legislature, and
opening court sessions with "God save the United States and this
honorable court."83  In 1989, the Supreme Court stated, "Our
previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the
pledge, characterizing them as consistent with the proposition that
government may not communicate an endorsement of religious
belief. 8 4 Even Justice Brennan, a famous separationist, stated in
dicta that if he were asked to decide the question, he would
craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be
as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service"); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973) (stating that the Lemon factors are "no more than helpful signposts").
Compare the preceding cases with Brennan's dissent in Lynch:
Although I agree with the Court that no single formula
can ever fully capture the analysis that may be
necessary to resolve difficult Establishment Clause
problems ... I fail to understand the Court's insistence
upon referring to the settled test set forth in Lemon as
simply one path that may be followed or not at the
Court's option .... At the same time, the Court's less
than vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests
that its commitment to those standards may only be
superficial.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696-97 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
81. See infra note 82.
82. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613-14 (Fernandez, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Harlan, Brennan, White, Goldberg, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, have all recognized the lack of danger
in the words "under God" and similar expressions for decades).
83. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (combining the purpose of solemnizing
with the history and ubiquity of such practices to find that they are
constitutional).
84. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613-14 (Fernandez, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-03).
probably find that public references like "One Nation Under God"
are constitutional.85
Il. A NEWDOW REVERSAL WOULD BE A BAD PRECEDENT FOR
SEPARATIONISTS
Reversing Newdow would be a bad precedent for
separationists. 86 Not only would it specifically allow for similar
state references to religion, but it could also cause the Lemon test,
which has produced decisions favored by separationists, to be
overturned. 7
Less than a year after the Court forged an historical
exception to the Lemon test in Marsh, it heard Lynch v. Donnelly,88
which dealt with a city government's inclusion of a nativity scene
in a Christmas display.84 The Court held the action constitutional
by employing an analysis strongly influenced by Marsh,
concluding that an interpretation of the Establishment Clause
should comport with its understanding of the Framer's intent.90
The Court prefaced its argument in Lynch by pointing out
that while the wall of separation between church and state is a
useful metaphor, it is not what the Constitution requires.9' The
85. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Brennan commented:
1 frankly do not know what should be the proper
disposition of features of our public life such as 'God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,' 'In
God We Trust,' 'One Nation Under God,' and the like.
I might well adhere to the view.., that such mottos are
consistent with the Establishment Clause, not because
their import is de minimis, but because they have lost
any true religious significance.
id.
86. See supra note 77.
87. See supra note 77.
88. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 673 ("The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
has comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees.").
91. See id. at 673 ("The concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure
of speech ... [b]ut the metaphor is not a wholly accurate description of the
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Lynch analysis continued in favor of allowing the nativity scene by
stating that, although the Constitution requires tolerance, it does
not call for "callous indifference" toward religion,92 and posited
that the First Amendment actually mandated some accommodation
of religion.
93
Seeing the difficulty of squaring these assertions with the
Lemon test, the Court explained that, while it has often found the
Lemon test to be a useful way of examining Establishment Clause
cases, it was "unwilling to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area. 94 In his dissent, Justice Brennan
stated that the Court was breaking from precedent by claiming that
it was not bound by Lemon, and that the Court seemed inclined to
give the Lemon test only superficial enforcement. 95
The controversy surrounding Newdow and the confusion
over how to interpret the Establishment Clause may prompt the
Supreme Court to abolish the Lemon test.96 The current Court has
refused to confine itself to the Lemon test. Justice O'Connor and
Justice Kennedy have proposed alternative tests, and three Justices
have suggested that they are simply lying in wait of a good
opportunity to eliminate the Lemon test. 97 Newdow's prohibition
of a practice that the Court has said in dicta that it would uphold,
practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state.").
92. See id. at 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
93. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the
Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively
mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions and forbids
hostility toward any."). Presumably the constitutional mandate for
accommodation stems from a reading of the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise clause together.
94. See id. at 679 (citing three cases in addition to Marsh). The Court did
cover its bases in Lynch by superficially applying the Lemon Test, holding that,
by viewing the inclusion of the nativity scene within the context of the
Christmas Season, they could discern a secular purpose. Id.
95. See id. at 696-97 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
96. See supra note 77.
97. See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 120 S.Ct. 2706, 2708
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, that he would have granted certiorari to an appeal to resolve the
issue of a stricken school board's policy of disclaiming evolution as only one
theory of creation, if only for the opportunity to finally inter the Lemon test).
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along with the public backlash the case has created, would be a
gift-wrapped opportunity for doing away with the "oft-criticized
9 8
test.9 9
IV. NEWDOW CREATED A PUBLIC BACKLASH
It is not yet clear whether the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to hear Newdow, but the court of public opinion has
already delivered its verdict. America is one nation "under God"
according to a majority of Americans who were outraged by
Newdow. 0
0
The same day Newdow was announced, the U.S. Senate
unanimously passed a resolution "expressing support for the
Pledge of Allegiance" and asking Senate counsel to "seek to
intervene in the case."'' ° Legislators from both political parties
were quoted expressing their outrage over the decision. Senator
Robert Byrd (D-WV) said he was the only remaining member of
Congress who voted to add the words to the Pledge in 1954, and
warned that any judges declaring the Pledge unconstitutional
would be blackballed. 0 2  Byrd further hoped that the Senate
98. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[The Court] applies the most rigid version of the oft-criticized test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman.... .').
99. See supra note 77.
100. See Richard S. Durham, One Nation, Under Conservative Judges,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul2002/nf2002071_1247.htm
(July 1, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); Vast Majority in
U.S. Support 'Under God', at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/29/poll.pledge
(June 30, 2002). Richard Durham noted:
According to a June 26-27 Fox News/Opinion
Dynamics Poll, 83% of Americans disagree with the
decision, while only 12% approve. And it's not just
Republican conservatives who decry this latest round
of judicial activism. Democrats give the ruling a big
thumbs down, 77% to 16%, as do liberals, 72% to
20%.
Durham, supra.
101. See Senators Call Pledge Decision 'Stupid', at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/26/senate.resolution.pledge/index.
html (June 27, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
102. Id.
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would, "waste no time throwing [the decision] back in the face of
this stupid judge."' 0 3 Then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
echoed Byrd's sentiments by stating "[]he decision is nuts."'04
Republican Senator Trent Lott referred to Newdow as an
"unbelievable decision" and a "stupid ruling."' 0 5  Senator
Christopher Bond, a Republican from Missouri, called the
decision, "the worst kind of political correctness run amok."' 0 6
Later that day more than 100 House members gathered on the
Capitol steps and recited the Pledge in a show of defiance.10 7
The Executive Branch also commented on the Newdow
decision. President Bush, in response to the ruling, said that
Newdow was "out of step with the traditions and history of
America" and promised to appoint judges who would affirm God's
role in public life.'0
Outraged political reactions emerged quickly and from all
comers of the political spectrum, in anticipation of their
constituents' response. 0 9  Iowa Republican Charles Grassley
explained the response candidly: "This decision is so much out of
the mainstream of thinking of Americans and the culture and
values that we hold in America, that any Congressman that voted
to take it out would be putting his tenure in Congress in jeopardy at
the next election.'
' 10
Many religious groups denounced the decision as well."'
For example, Jerry Falwell, televangelist and Baptist pastor, called
for mass civil disobedience in the form of ongoing classroom
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Pledge Ruling Not Popular, to Say the Least, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/07/pledge.allegiance/index.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Pledge Ruling Not Popular].
107. Id.
108. See Bush Calls Pledge Ruling 'Out of Step', at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/06/27fbush-pledge.htm#more (June
27, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
109. Pledge Ruling Not Popular, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. See 'Under God' embraced in court ofpublic opinion, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=l 6918
(September 6, 2002).
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pledge recitations. 1 2 Even some traditional separation advocates,
like the Anti-Defamation League 11 3 and the National Education
Association, dismissed the decision. 1
4
Because Newdow was immediately stayed, the case's only
practical effects so far have been to bolster the opposition and fuel
misperceptions about separationists.' 15 Both effects will likely
spill over from Newdow into other separation issues.
An editorial in The New York Times summed up the
predicament Newdow has created for separationists: "We wish the
words had not been added back in 1954. But just the way removing
a well-lodged foreign body from an organism may sometimes be
more damaging than letting it stay put, removing those words
would cause more harm than leaving them in."
'
"
16
The decision is likely to be a huge public relations victory
for accomodationists and could "give President Bush carte blanche
to stack the federal bench" with accomodationist judges. 17 The
public relations victory Newdow has given accomodationists is
why even those who believe Newdow was correctly decided think
the suit was a poor battle to choose. For example, Douglas
Laycock of the University of Texas School of Law defended the
ruling in principle but said that it was a "stupid thing to do" in light
of public sentiments."i8 Laycock pointed out that "[t]he harm done
by such practices is extraordinarily modest," and that the case
"would weaken citizens' faith in the courts as they handle more
troublesome aspects of public religion."'"19
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See also Federal Appeals Court Bans Pledge of Allegiance in
Schools, at http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0209/rights.html (last visited March
15, 2003) (mentioning that NEA Board of Directors voted to support the current
version of the Pledge) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
115. Shenandoah, supra note 4 (suggesting a possible conspiracy between
Americans United, the ACLU and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
116. 'One Nation Under God', N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A28.
117. Durham, supra note 100.
118. See Richard N. Ostling, Despite courts, Americans Want to Be
'Under God, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 8, 2002, at A8, available
at http://www.pjstar.com/news/sept 1/ap/g104703a.html.
119. Id.
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Perhaps the biggest concern about Newdow for
separationists is the effect the backlash it has created will have on
other separation issues. According to an editorial in the New York
Times:
Most important, the ruling trivializes the
critical constitutional issue of separation of
church and state. There are important battles
to be fought virtually every year over issues
of prayer in school and use of government
funds to support religious activities.
Yesterday's decision is almost certain to be
overturned on appeal. But the sort of rigid
overreaction that characterized it will not
make genuine defense of the First
Amendment any easier.'
20
One issue that may be affected by the public backlash from
Newdow is the national debate over school vouchers.' 21 The day
after the Ninth Circuit announced Newdow, the Supreme Court
announced a landmark decision of its own in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,122 holding that a school voucher program in Cleveland,
Ohio, was constitutional. 23 The attention the voucher case would
normally have received was swallowed up in the wake of
Newdow's media attention. Zelman was a huge blow to
separationists because it could potentially lead to significant state
funds being funneled to religious schools, so long as the programs
incorporate necessary elements of neutrality and parental choice. 124
But voucher opponents could not speak out against it with as much
120. One Nation Under God, supra note 116.
121. For further reading on the legal issues surrounding school vouchers,
see Thomas Berg et al., Joint Statement of Church-State Scholars on School
Vouchers and the Constitution: What the United States Supreme Court Has
Settled. What Remains Disputed, in SCHOOL VOUCHERS: SETTLED QRESTIONS,
CONTINUING DISPUTES, 3-14 (Pew Fourm on Religion and Public Life, 2002),
available at http://pewforum.org/issues/files/VoucherPackage.pdf.
122. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
123. See Douglas Laycock, Vouching Towards Bethlehem, 5 RELIGION IN
THE NEws, Summer 2002, available at
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol5No2/vouching.htm.
124. See Berg et al., supra note 121 at 5-6.
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fervor as they would have liked, since the decision came only a
day after Newdow. 125 There was little chance of garnering public
outrage over a decision that Justice Souter characterized as a break
from liberal precedent dating back to Everson,126 because the
public was still immersed in the Pledge of Allegiance
controversy. 
27
How long this public backlash continues will be a key
factor while the voucher issue is argued in state courts.'28 Zelman
provided a blueprint for a voucher program acceptable under the
Federal Constitution, but whether replica programs will be
acceptable under individual state constitutions will be a hotly
debated issue in the future. 29 Many state constitutions contain
specific prohibitions that would make voucher programs more
difficult to implement. However, that obstacle is mitigated by the
fact that state constitutions are more easily amended than the
Federal Constitution. Additionally, the voucher debate will have to
be fought in a post-Newdow environment. 130  Thus, Michael
Newdow's poorly chosen battle and the public backlash it has
created will likely make it easier for voucher advocates to have
success on the state level.
V. CONCLUSION: NEWDOWWAS A POORLY CHOSEN BATTLE
Whether or not Newdow was rightly decided is an
impossible question to answer. Both the majority and dissenting
opinion offer compelling and sound legal arguments. Whether one
agrees with the decision depends largely upon her core beliefs
about religion and how the Constitution should be interpreted.
Likewise, whether or not the extrication of references like "under
God" is good public policy is an impossible question to answer.
Again, a person's answer depends largely upon her background.
125. See Laycock, supra note 122.
126. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2485 (Souter J., dissenting).
127. See Laycock, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. See Berg et al., supra note 121 at 8-9.
130. Id
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The only clear answer with regard to Newdow is that bringing the
suit was a bad idea.
Michael Newdow is an advocate of separation of church
and state who won an impressive battle in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. But his victory could cause separationists to lose the
war over separation of church and state because the case will likely
be overturned and set a precedent lowering the wall of separation
that currently exists. Furthermore, because Newdow has created a
public backlash, it will make future separationist efforts more
difficult to achieve. Particularly in post 9-11 America, when prayer
and patriotism have been unifying forces and legal scholars are
questioning the legitimacy of the concept of separation of church
and state, Newdow was a poor battle to choose.' 31 Newdow's
victory in the Ninth Circuit could lead to the Supreme Court, as
well as the majority of citizens, declaring that the United States is
indeed one nation "under God."
131. See Ostling, supra note 118.
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